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Abstract
The strongest threat model for voting systems considers coer-
cion resistance: protection against coercers that force voters
to modify their votes, or to abstain. Existing remote voting
systems either do not provide this property; require an ex-
pensive tallying phase; or burden users with the need to store
cryptographic key material and with the responsibility to de-
ceive their coercers. We propose VOTEAGAIN, a scalable
voting scheme that relies on the revoting paradigm to provide
coercion resistance. VOTEAGAIN uses a novel deterministic
ballot padding mechanism to ensure that coercers cannot see
whether a vote has been replaced. This mechanism ensures
tallies take quasilinear time, making VOTEAGAIN the first
revoting scheme that can handle elections with millions of
voters. We prove that VOTEAGAIN provides ballot privacy,
coercion resistance, and verifiability; and we demonstrate its
scalability using a prototype implementation of all crypto-
graphic primitives.
1 Introduction
Remote electronic voting, i.e., voting outside a poll-booth en-
vironment, in which voters cast their ballot from their devices
is susceptible to large-scale vote buying and coercion [31].
Yet, many deployed electronic voting systems [2, 26, 37] do
not support coercion resistance. This may be suitable in West-
ern democracies where freedom and privacy are well rooted
in society. However, under more authoritarian regimes [29] or
in younger democracies [33], coercion is a serious problem.
There are two kind of coercion-resistant electronic voting
systems in the literature. The first kind provides users with
fake voting credentials that voters use/produce when coerced,
enabling deletion of coerced votes [13,31]. This approach has
several downsides: (i) voters need to store their true voting cre-
dential on their devices, (ii) the system cannot give feedback
on whether the correct credential was used, and thus voters
cannot be sure if their vote has been recorded correctly at the
time of voting, and (iii) voters need to convincingly lie while
being coerced which may be a challenge. The second kind
relies on the revoting paradigm [1,25,32,34]. These schemes
avoid the drawbacks associated with the fake-credential ap-
proach by allowing voters to submit fully to coercers, and
instead enabling them to supersede coerced votes by casting
a new ballot. This approach requires that the coercer cannot
detect whether a voter has cast new ballots. To achieve this,
state-of-the-art schemes [1,32] require a quadratic number of
operations, concretely a pair-wise comparison of all ballots,
to privately filter superseded ballots. As an example, for the
Iowa Democratic caucus with only 176,574 voters, Achen-
bach et al.’s solution [1] would require 1.8 core years to filter
the ballots.
We propose VOTEAGAIN, a scalable coercion-resistant
(re)voting scheme. VOTEAGAIN’s efficiency relies on two
key insights: First, one can hide the number of ballots per
user by inserting a deterministic number of dummy ballots
which depends solely on the number of voters and the number
of cast ballots. Thus, it reveals nothing about the number
of ballots cast by individual voters, hiding any (re)voting
patterns induced by voters or coercers. Second, because of the
deterministic nature of the approach one can execute filtering
in the clear, reducing the filtering time from quadratic to
quasilinear: O(n logn) where n is the number of ballots. As a
result, for the Iowa caucus our construction requires under 14
core minutes. We estimate that VOTEAGAIN using 224 cores
(less than $50 on Amazon, or $75K on dedicated hardware)
can filter hundreds of millions of ballots in hours.
We make the following contributions:
XWe introduce VOTEAGAIN, a novel remote electronic revot-
ing scheme based on well defined and widely used crypto-
graphic constructions.
X We introduce a novel efficient deterministic padding
scheme that hides revoting at a low cost. The complexity
of the resulting filtering phases is O(n logn) where n is the
number of ballots. Our experiments show that in many practi-
cal scenarios the cost can be even lower.
XWe show that previous definitions of coercion resistance in
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the revoting setting are vacuous. We provide a new coercion-
resistance definition and we adapt modern definitions of ballot
privacy [7] and verifiability [14, 15] to the re-voting setting.
We prove that VOTEAGAIN satisfies these definitions.
X We evaluate the scalability of VOTEAGAIN on a proto-
type implementation of all the cryptographic primitives. Our
results show that VOTEAGAIN can support elections with
millions of users.
2 Related Work
Coercion-resistant voting schemes fall under two categories:
either they enable voters to generate fake authentication cre-
dentials or they allow the voter to revote. Coercion resistant
schemes using fake credentials, introduced by Juels et al. [31]
(JCJ), are used in several voting schemes [3, 10, 12, 13]. In
these schemes, the voter has both real and fake authentica-
tion credentials (or pre-registered passwords and panic pass-
words [12, 18]). When coerced, the voter lies to the coercer,
using a fake authentication credential (or handling it to the
coercer), resulting in a non-counted ballot. Ballots cast with
the real credential are counted. These schemes provide the
real authentication credential to the voter during registration
phase (in which the coercer must be absent). The voter must
securely store this authetication credentials for later use, i.e.,
voters need to maintain a cryptographic state.
Coercion resistant schemes based on revoting allow voters
to cast multiple ballots and then filter these ballots, typically
considering the last ballot per voter. For such a scheme to be
coercion resistant, the filtering stage must be deniable [1], i.e.,
it must not expose which ballots are filtered, as this would ex-
pose revoting actions. Black box filtering where a trusted third
party (TTP) performs the filtering privately is deniable [23],
but not verifiable. To the best of our knowledge, there exist
two publicly-verifiable deniable re-voting schemes [1,32]. To
obtain public verifiability these schemes use a distributed au-
thority to compare each pair of ballots (i.e., O(n2) operations)
before shuffling to privately mark superseded ballots. After
shuffling, these marks are decrypted and the tallying server
verifiably filters superseded ballots. As literally specified in
these papers, these schemes are ‘not efficient for large scale
elections’. We confirm in Section 6 that Achenbach et al. [1]
cannot even handle small elections of thousands of users.
For authentication, most schemes require users to store
cryptographic state [1, 10, 13, 23, 31, 32, 36], or remember
special passwords [12, 18]. Helios [2] and Apollo [22] rely
on regular username/password. To improve verifiability (by
distributing the trust of the entity deciding which users are
eligible voters), some schemes require that voters authenticate
to k out of t parties [3, 10, 13, 31]. However, this results in a
complex registration phase for the user where, additionally,
the coercer is assumed to be absent. Table 1 summarizes the
comparison between VOTEAGAIN and previous work.
Table 1: Comparison of different voting schemes.
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JCJ [10, 13, 31] No1 Yes n2 Yes k of t
Black-box [23] TTP No n Yes Unclear
Revote [1, 32] k of t Yes n2 Yes TTP
Helios [2] revoting is not possible No TTP
VOTEAGAIN TTP Yes n logn No TTP
Table 2: Comparison of assumptions of different voting
schemes.
Ballot Coercion
Privacy Verifiability Resistance
JCJ [10, 13, 31] k of t k of t k of t
Black-box [23] k of t TTP TTP
Revote [1, 32] k of t2 TTP3 k of t
Helios [2] k of t TTP Not CR
VOTEAGAIN k of t TTP TTP
3 System and threat model
Actors. There are five actors in VOTEAGAIN: voters, a polling
authority, a bulletin board, a tally server, and trustees.
Voters Voters interact with the polling authority and the public
bulletin board to cast their ballots. Each voter has the means to
authenticate herself to the polling authority (e.g., an electronic
identity card). There are n voters.
Polling Authority (PA) The PA authenticates users and pro-
vides them with ephemeral voting tokens. Voters use these
tokens to sign their ballots before posting them to the public
bulletin board.
Public Bulletin Board (PBB) The PBB is an append-only list
of cast ballots. Ballots are posted during the election phase
by the voters. During the tally phase, the tally server and
trustees post their proofs and results to the bulletin board.
Ad-hoc implementations [27] or blockchain-based implemen-
tations [20, 21] would be suitable for our PBB.
Tally Server (TS) The TS filters the ballots. It adds dummy
ballots, shuffles the ballots, groups them by voter, and selects
the last ballot for each voter.
Trustees The trustees mix and decrypt the selected ballots to
reveal the outcome of the election. Each trustee has a partial
decryption key for a k-out-of-t encryption system.
1Revoting is possible, but revotes are not deniable. JCJ instead achieves
coercion resistance using fake authentication credentials.
3In the case of [32], they present an everlasting privacy preserving scheme
assuming the existence of anonymous channels.
3Can be extended to k of t using a JCJ type of credentials system.
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Table 3: Trust assumptions on the parties of VOTEAGAIN.
Entities Ballot Privacy Verifiability Coercion resistance
PA No Yes Yes
TS No No Yes
PBB No No No
Trustees k-out-of-t No No
Threat model. We assume an adversary A whose goal is to
coerce voters into casting votes for a particular candidate or
to abstain. This adversary, although computationally bounded,
may coerce any voter – but not all voters. Under coercion,
the coerced voter does exactly as instructed and the coercer
learns all information stored and received by the voter at the
time of coercion. We assume that after coercion the coercer
does not control a voter for some time before the end of
the election, such that the voter can cast at least one more
vote after coercion. We also assume that the user’s means of
authentication is inalienable [1], that is, a coercer can neither
eliminate nor duplicate a voter’s means of authentication.
While these assumptions are strong, we point out that so
are the assumption behind coercion resistant solutions that
rely on fake credentials [10, 13, 31]: users cannot be coerced
during registration, users can lie convincingly, and users can
store and hide cryptographic key material. These assumptions
are not needed in VOTEAGAIN. Our construction allows users
to vote from any device, preventing coercion attacks relying
on destroying or stealing the voting device.
In VOTEAGAIN, voters authenticate against the PA every
time before voting to obtain an ephemeral voting token. Thus,
the PA must be honest with respect to verifiability and coer-
cion resistance. To enable quasilinear filtering we also require
that the TS is honest with respect to coercion resistance. This
assumption is stronger than Achenbach et al.’s k-out-of-t as-
sumption on the trustees [1], but their relaxation comes at a
quadratic computational cost, see Table 1.
Finally, we require VOTEAGAIN to satisfy the following
informal properties formalized in Section 5 (see Table 3):
Definition 1 (Ballot privacy [7]). Assuming that at least k
trustees are honest, no coalition of malicious parties (includ-
ing the PA and TS) can learn the vote of an honest user.
Definition 2 (Coercion resistance). Assuming that the PA
and TS are honest, no coercer can use the PBB to determine
if coercion was successful or not, provided that the election
outcome does not leak this information.
Definition 3 (Verifiability). Assuming that the PA is honest,
VOTEAGAIN guarantees that: (i) the last ballot per voter will
be tallied, (ii) adversary A cannot include more malicious
votes in the tally than the number of voters it controls, and
(iii) honest ballots cannot be replaced. If voters do not verify
that their ballots are correctly appended to the PBB, ballots
can be dropped or replaced by earlier ballots if those exist.
4 The VOTEAGAIN voting scheme
Preliminaries. Let ` be a security parameter. Let G be a
cyclic group of prime order p generated by generator g. We
write Zp for the integers modulo p. We write a∈R A to denote
that a is chosen uniformly at random from the set A.
VOTEAGAIN uses the ElGamal’s encryption scheme given
by: A key generation algorithm EC.KeyGen(G,g, p) which
outputs a public-private key-pair (pk = gsk,sk) for sk ∈R Zp;
an encryption function EC.Enc(pk,m) which takes as input a
public key pk and a message m ∈G and returns a ciphertext
c=(c1,c2)= (gr,m ·pkr) for r∈R Zp; and an decryption algo-
rithm EC.Dec(sk,c) which returns the message m = c2 · c−sk1 .
VOTEAGAIN uses deterministic encryption (with randomness
zero) as a cheap verifiable ‘encoding’ for the dummy bal-
lots. This allows a trivial cheap verification of correctness of
encryption.
We use a traditional signature scheme given by: A
key generation algorithm Sig.Keygen(1`) that generates a
public-private key-pair (pkσ,skσ); a signing algorithm σ =
Sig.Sign(skσ,m) that signs messages m ∈ {0,1}∗; and a veri-
fication algorithm Sig.Verify(pkσ,σ,m) that outputs > if σ is
a valid signature on m and ⊥ otherwise.
We use verifiable shuffles [4] to support coercion resistance
in a private way. These enable an entity to verifiably shuffle
of a list of homomorphic ciphertexts in such a way that it is
infeasible for a computationally bounded adversary to match
input and output ciphertexts.
VOTEAGAIN uses mixnets, a standard approach [9, 30,
35] to compute the election result given the filtered
ballots output by the TS. The trustees jointly run the
Vote.DKeyGen(1`,k, t,nC) protocol where ` is the security
parameter `, nC the number of candidates, t the number
of trustees, and k is the number of trustees needed to de-
crypt ciphertexts. This protocol outputs a public encryp-
tion key pkT and each trustee i obtains a private decryption
key skT,i. To encrypt her vote for candidate c, a voter calls
(v,pi) = Vote.Enc(pkT,c) to obtain an encrypted vote v and
proof pi that v encrypts a choice for a valid candidate. We
denote the encryption of the zero candidate (i.e. no candi-
date) with explicit randomizer r ∈R Zp by Vote.ZEnc(pkT;r).
The algorithm Vote.Verify(pkT,v,pi) outputs > if the en-
crypted vote v is correct, and ⊥ otherwise. Given a list
of selected votes {V1, . . . ,Vκ}, the trustees jointly run the
(r,Π)← Vote.MixDecryptTally(pkT,{V1, . . . ,Vκ}) protocol to
compute the election result r and a proof of correctness Π. In-
ternally, Vote.MixDecryptTally uses a standard verifiable mix
network and verifiable decryption to shuffle and decrypt the
ballots, and then computes the final result in the clear. Any ver-
ifier can run Vote.VerifyTally(pkT,{V1, . . . ,Vκ},r,Π) to verify
whether the result r is computed correctly.
The TS uses standard zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge [24] to prove that it operated correctly. We use the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [19] to convert them into non-interactive
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proofs of knowledge. We adopt the Camenisch-Stadler nota-
tion [11] to denote such proofs and write, for example,
SPK{(sk) : pk = gsk ∧ m = EC.Dec(sk, I)}
to denote the non-interactive signature proof of knowledge
that the prover knows the private key sk corresponding to pk
and that I decrypts to m under sk.
4.1 Overview of VOTEAGAIN’s operation
We begin by giving an overview of the key concepts of
VOTEAGAIN. It proceeds in three phases: the pre-election
phase, the election phase, and the tally phase. See Table 4
for a summary of frequently used symbols. In this section we
introduce the scheme, and proceed with a detailed description
in Section 4.2
Pre-election phase. In the pre-election phase, the PA assigns
to each eligible voter a unique, randomly generated, voter
identifier vidi. The correspondence between voters and their
voter identifiers is private to the PA. The PA also generates a
random token index mi for each of the voters. These indexes
enable selecting the last ballot of each voter.
Election phase. The flow of the election phase is illustrated in
Figure 1. Voters first authenticate to PA to obtain a ephemeral
voting token τ. They use this token to sign their ballot β
containing their encrypted vote. Last, they post the ballot on
the bulletin board. In more detail:
1. The voter authenticates to the PA using her inalienable
means of authentication.
2. The PA looks up the corresponding identifier vidi, and
token index mi encrypts them as γ and I and sends them
with a token τ to the voter. Moreover, the PA immediately
increments mi by one.
3. The voter encrypts her vote using an encryption scheme
that permits homomorphic tallying of the votes. She also
generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof show-
ing that the vote has been correctly formed. She collects
the encrypted vote v, the encrypted voter identifier γ and
the encrypted index I into a ballot and signs it using her
token. She sends the signed ballot β to the bulletin board
which verifies the ballot before accepting it.
4. The voter verifies that her ballot β has been added cor-
rectly.
Tally phase. In the tally phase (see Figure 2), the TS takes
the ballots from the PBB, adds dummy ballots, and shuffles
them. Then, it selects the last vote per voter. Then, to prevent
dummy voters from making an overhead in the shuffle and
decrypt phase, it shuffles the selected ballots and removes
all ballots cast by dummy voters. Finally, the trustees shuffle
and decrypt the selected ballots from real voters. The proofs
generated by the TS guarantee that no dummy vote is included
in the final tally. The goal of the tally phase is to count the
last ballot of each vote (see Figure 2). The TS takes the votes
from the PBB, adds dummy votes, and shuffles them. Then,
it filters the last vote per voter, privately canceling dummy
votes. Finally, the trustees decrypt the remaining votes. In
more detail (see Figure 3, for a representation of steps 1 to 4)
1. The TS retrieves all real ballots from the PBB.
2. The TS selects the votes Vi that should be tallied and
produces a proof Φ that it did so correctly as follows
(a) The TS computes dummy ballots (corresponding
to existing or new voters), in such a way that the
coercer’s view of the tally phase is the same, re-
gardless of whether voters revoted or not. It adds
these dummy ballots to her proof Φ.
(b) The TS shuffles all ballots, and writes the shuffled
ballots to Φ together with a proof that the shuffling
was performed correctly.
(c) The TS then decrypts γ and I in each of the shuffled
ballots, writing the resulting voter identifiers vid
and ballot indices m to Φ. It then group ballots by
vid. Now filtering ballots is fast and verifiable: the
TS can publicly select the last ballot corresponding
to a voter identifier vidi, namely the one with the
largest index m.
(d) To ensure that dummy votes are not counted, the
TS computes the selected vote Vi for each group
as either an encryption of zero (if the group corre-
sponds to a dummy voter) or of the last real ballot
(if the group corresponds to a real voter). For each
group the TS proves that the reencryption is correct
without revealing whether the group corresponds to
a dummy voter. The TS writes the proof of correct
reencryption to Φ.
The TS posts the Vi and Φ to the PBB.
3. The trustees retrieve the ballots βi, selected votes Vi, and
proof of correct filtering Φ from the PBB, and verify the
correctness of the ballots and the proof Φ.
4. Finally, the trustees homomorphically add the selected
votes, and verifiably decrypt them.
As all steps are published in the PBB, an external auditors
can verify that all steps in the tally and filtering phases were
performed correctly.
4.2 VOTEAGAIN formal description
In this section we give more detailed description of the differ-
ent phases of VOTEAGAIN.
4.2.1 Pre-election phase
The pre-election phase consists exclusively of the Setup pro-
cedure.
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Table 4: Summary of notation.
Symbol Description
(G,g, p) Group, generator and prime order
Zp Integers modulo the group order p
N Number of eligible voters
t,k Number of trustees and decryption threshold
pkPA,pkTS,pkT Public keys of PA, TS and trustees
skPA,skTS,skT,i Private keys of PA, TS and trustee i
vidi,mi Voter identifier and ballot index of voter i
γ, I The encrypted vid and ballot index
pk,sk Ephemeral signing keys
τ,στ Ephemeral voting token and signature by PA
β,σ Ballot and signature using ephemeral key pk
v,pi Encrypted vote and zero knowledge proof of
correct encryption
nB,nD Number of real and dummy ballots on the board
θ,θR,θD Ballot tags for unknown, real, and dummy ballots
vidi,mi Decrypted voter identifier and ballot index
pideci ,pi
sel
i Zero knowledge proof of correct decryption
and vote selection
V i Selected vote for group i
r Election result
Φ,Π Full filter and tally proofs
Procedure 1 (Setup). To setup an election system with secu-
rity parameter `, electoral roll E , candidate list C , threshold k
and t trustees, the different entities run the Setup(1`,E ,C ,k, t)
procedure. First, they pick a group G with generator g and
prime order p. They then proceed with the following steps:
1. The PBB initializes the bulletin board, and adds the list
of candidates C to the bulletin board.
2. The PA stores the electoral roll E . Let N be the number
of eligible voters on the electoral roll. The PA generates
a random and unique voter identifier vidi ∈G and ballot
index mi ∈ {2`−2, . . . ,2`−1 − 1} for each voter Vi on
the electoral roll and stores them internally. Finally, the
PA generates a public-private key-pair (pkPA,skPA) =
Sig.Keygen(1`) to sign tokens. It publishes pkPA.
3. The TS generates a public-private ElGamal key-pair
(pkTS,skTS) = EC.KeyGen(G,g, p). It publishes pkTS.
4. The trustees run Vote.DKeyGen(1`,k, t, |C |) to generate
a public encryption key pkT and decryption keys skT,i
that the trustees keep private.
4.2.2 Election phase
The election phase consists of three procedures, the voting
token request, the vote cast and the verification by the PBB
of the validity of the cast ballot.
Procedure 2 (GetToken(id,Auth)). On input her identity id
and her inalienable means of authentication Auth:
Voter
Polling
Authority
Public
Bulletin
Board
1. Authenticate
2. Return token τ containing
encrypted identifier γ and index I
3. Cast ballot β containing v, γ and I
4. Verify that ballot β has been added
Figure 1: Election phase: Overview.
1. The voter authenticates to the PA using Auth.
2. The PA looks up the corresponding voter identifier vidi
and ballot index mi. Then, the PA encrypts the voter
identifier γ= EC.Enc(pkTS,vidi) and ballot number I =
EC.Enc(pkTS,mi) (it first encodes mi as an element of
G), and increments the ballot index mi := mi + 1. The
PA hides the index mi from the user to prevent coercers –
who can see what users can see under coercion – from
being able to detect whether the user revoted.
3. The PA creates an ephemeral signing key (pk,sk) =
Sig.Keygen() and signs this key together with the en-
crypted voter identifier and ballot number:
στ = Sig.Sign(skPA,pk ‖ γ ‖ I)
and returns the token τ= (pk,sk,γ, I,στ) to the user.
4. The user verifies the token τ= (pk,sk,γ, I,στ) by check-
ing that Sig.Verify(pkPA,στ,pk ‖ γ ‖ I) =>.
Procedure 3 (Vote(τ,c)). To cast a vote, the voter takes as
private input the ephemeral voting token τ= (pk,sk,γ, I,στ)
and a candidate c ∈ C , and then proceeds as follows:
1. Encrypts her candidate c as (v,pi) = Vote.Enc(pkT,c) to
obtain ciphertext v and zero-knowledge proof of correct
encryption pi.
2. Creates the ballot
β= (v,pi,pk,γ, I,στ,σ)
where σ= Sig.Sign(sk,v ‖ pi ‖ pk ‖ γ ‖ I ‖ στ). The voter
posts the ballot β to the public bulletin board.
3. The public bulletin board runs Valid(β), see below, to
check that the ballot is valid, before appending it.
4. Finally, the voter verifies that the ballot β has been ap-
pended to the bulletin board.
Procedure 4 (Valid(β)). The bulletin board verifies that the
ballot β= (v,pi,pk,γ, I,στ,σ) is valid with respect to the cur-
rent state of the bulletin board as follows:
1. The PBB checks the correctness of the encrypted vote; of
the user’s signature using the ephemeral key pk; and the
PA’s signature on this ephemeral key pk, the encrypted
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Public
Bulletin
Board
Tally Server
Trustees
1. Get ballots βi
2. Post selected votes Vi
and proof of correct filter Φ
3. Get βi,Vi,Φ
4. Post result r and
proof of correct tally Π
Figure 2: Tally phase: Overview
voter identifier γ, and the encrypted ballot number I:
Vote.Verify(pkT,v,pi) =>
Sig.Verify(pk,σ,v ‖ pi ‖ pk ‖ γ ‖ I ‖ στ) =>
Sig.Verify(pkPA,στ,pk ‖ γ ‖ I) =>.
2. The PBB checks that neither the encrypted vote v nor
the key pk appear in any ballot β′ on the bulletin board.
If any of these checks fails, the bulletin board returns ⊥, oth-
erwise, the PBB returns >.
4.2.3 Tally phase
We define two procedures, one to filter votes (Filter), and one
to tally the selected ballots (Tally):
Procedure 5 (Filter). After the election closes, the TS selects
the selected votes Vi and produces the filter proof Φ. If it
aborts, it publishes the current Φ to the public bulletin board.
1. The tally server (TS) retrieves an ordered list of
ballots [β1, . . . ,βnB ] from the PBB, where βi =
(vi,pii,pki,γi, Ii,στi ,σi). The TS verifies the ballots by
running step 1 of Valid and verifies that there are are no
duplicate votes vi or ephemeral public keys pki on the
bulletin board. If any of these checks fails, the TS sets
Φ=⊥, posts it to the bulletin board, and aborts.
2. The TS removes the proofs and signatures to ob-
tain stripped ballots. It provably tags the ballots as
‘real’ ballots using a deterministic ElGamal encryption
(with randomness zero) of the value g0 = 1G, θR =
EC.Enc(pkTS,g0) = (g0,g0pk0) = (1G,1G):
β′i = (vi,γi, Ii,θR).
Next, the TS creates nD dummy ballots and provably tags
them as such using a deterministic ElGamal encryption
of the value g, θD = EC.Enc(pkTS,g) = (1G,g ·pk0):
β′i = (vε,γi, Ii,θD),
where i > nB and vε = Vote.ZEnc(pkT;0). We explain
below how the TS determines the number of dummies
nD as well as the values for γi and Ii. The TS adds the
stripped ballots B′ = [β′1, . . . ,β
′
nB+nD ] to Φ.
3. The TS shuffles the stripped ballots B′ = [β′1, . . . ,
β′nB+nD ] and randomizes the ciphertexts, to obtain a
list of shuffled and randomized stripped ballots B′′ =
[β′′1 , . . . ,β
′′
nB+nD ], which it adds, together with a proof piσ
that this shuffle was performed correctly, to Φ.
4. The TS now operates on each shuffled ballot β′′i =
(v′i,γ′i, I′i ,θ′i). It decrypts γ′i to recover the shuffled and
decrypted identifier, vidi. It also decrypts I′i to obtain the
shuffled ballot index mi and proves it did so correctly:
pideci = SPK{(skTS) : pkTS = gskTS∧
vidi = EC.Dec(skTS,γ′i)∧
mi = EC.Dec(skTS, I′i )}
It then adds C = [(vid1,m1,pidec1 ), . . . ,(vidnB+nD ,
mnB+nD ,pidecnB+nD)] to Φ. The TS aborts and adds ⊥ to Φ
if the decrypted ballot indices mi are not unique for a
given voter identifier. More precisely, it aborts if there
exists indices i, j; i 6= j such that (vidi,mi) = (vid j,m j).
5. The TS groups the ballots with the same voter identifier,
and selects the ballot with the highest ballot index from
each group. Let G1, . . . ,Gκ be the sets of ballot indices
grouped by voter identifier. Consider group G j of size χ j.
Let j∗= argmaxk,k∈G j mk be the index for which the bal-
lot index m j∗ is maximal. Group G j either corresponds
to a real voter, or to a fake voter. The TS produces a
reencryption V j of the encrypted votes as follows:
(a) If the group G j corresponds to a real voter, then
the TS simply reencrypts the vote corresponding
to the last ballot, i.e., it picks r j at random and sets
V j = v j∗ ·Vote.ZEnc(pkT;r j),
to a randomized encryption of v j∗.
(b) If the group G j corresponds to a fake voter, then
picks r j at random and sets V j to an empty vote:
V j = Vote.ZEnc(pkT;r j).
The TS proves that it computed the V j correctly. If the
corresponding voter is real, then the ballot β′′j∗ selected in
(a) should be a real ballot, so EC.Dec(skTS,θ′j∗) should
equal g0. If the voter is fake, then for all tags θ′ik with
ik ∈ G j, we have that EC.Dec(skTS,θ′ik) = g1. Let G j =
{i1, . . . , iχ j} and θ=∏
χ j
k=1 θ
′
ik , then the TS constructs the
proof
piselj = SPK{(r j,skTS) : pkTS = gskTS∧
((g0 =EC.Dec(skTS,θ′j∗)∧V j = v j∗ ·Vote.ZEnc(pkT;r j))∨
(gχ j =EC.Dec(skTS,θ)∧V j =Vote.ZEnc(pkT;r j)))}.
The TS adds the list of filtered encrypted votes F =
[(vid1,V 1,pisel1 ), . . . ,(vidκ,V κ,pi
sel
κ )] to Φ.
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Selected votes including dummy voters
V1 Vn
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dummies shuffle
decrypt γ′i, I′i
and group
Compute selected votes
Shuffle and
reveal+remove dummies
Figure 3: High-level overview of ballot filtering and grouping. Let nB be the number of ballots, nD be the number of dummies,
nT = nB +nD their sum, κ be the number of voters plus number of dummy voters, and χi the number of (dummy) ballots for
(dummy) voter i. First, the TS adds dummy ballots and proves they are well-formed. Then shuffles all ballots without the proofs,
hiding which ballots were dummies. Then it verifiably decrypts both the encrypted voter identifiers γ′i and the encrypted indices
I′i to group the ballots by vid and to select the last votes V i. Finally, it outputs the selected votes Vi without dummies.
6. The list SD = [V 1, . . . ,V κ] of selected votes contains bal-
lots by dummy voters. In the next two steps, the TS
removes these. First, the TS shuffles and randomizes the
ciphertexts to obtain a new list S ′D = [V
′
1, . . . ,V
′
κ] , which
it adds, together with a proof pi′σ of correct shuffle, to Φ.
7. The TS knows the indices D of votes in S ′D that corre-
spond to dummy voters and randomizers ri such that
V ′i = Vote.ZEnc(pkT;ri) for i ∈D. The TS adds D and
R = [ri]i∈D to Φ.
8. Finally, the TS publishes the remaining votes S = [V1,
. . . ,Vn] and the full proof Φ to the public bulletin board.
The filter procedure ensures that the TS cannot replace
ballots by real voters: a selected vote must either correspond
to a ballot by a real voter (condition a) or the selected vote is
empty and the voter is a dummy voter (condition b). Moreover,
the TS can only remove votes cast by dummy voters.
Procedure 6 (Tally). To compute the final tally, the trustees
proceed as follows:
1. The trustees verify that the TS operated honestly by
running the VerifyFilter() algorithm (see below). If Veri-
fyFilter returns ⊥ they return (r,Π) = (⊥,⊥).
2. Let S = [V1, . . . ,Vκ]. The trustees jointly run the (r,Π)←
Vote.MixDecryptTally(pkT,S). They publish the election
result r and the zero knowledge proof of correctness Π
to the public bulletin board.
4.2.4 Verification
Any external auditor can use the PBB to verify that all steps
in the tally and filtering phases were performed correctly. We
define the following verification procedures:
Procedure 7 (VerifyFilter). Any party can verify that the
filtering processes was performed correctly by running
VerifyFilter(). This algorithm examines the content of the bul-
letin board and performs the following checks:
1. First, check if all ballots are correct and that no duplicate
votes or public keys are included in the ballots as per
step 1 of Filter. If the checks fail, the bulletin board
should contain Φ = ⊥; VerifyFilter returns ⊥ if that is
not the case. Otherwise, it continues.
2. It next retrieves the selected votes S and the proof Φ
from the bulletin board and continues as follows:
(a) Verify that stripped real ballots are correctly
formed. Consider ballots [β1, . . . ,βnB ], where βi =
(vi,pii,pki,γi, Ii,στi ,σi) and check that the stripped
ballot β′i = (vi,γi, Ii,θR) has been added to Φ
(where θR is as above).
(b) Verify that the dummy ballots on the bulletin board
are correctly formed. For ballots β′nB+1, . . . ,β
′
nB+nD
where β′i = (vi,γi, Ii,θi), check that vi = vε and θi =
θD (where vε and θD are as above).
(c) Let B′ = [β′1, . . . ,β
′
nB+nD ] be all stripped ballots,
and B′′ = [β′′1 , . . . ,β
′′
nB+nD ] the shuffled and random-
ized ballots. Verify the shuffle proof piσ to check
that B′′ is a correct shuffle of B′.
(d) Next, let C = [(vid1,m1,pidec1 ), . . . ,(vidnB+nD ,
mnB+nD ,pidecnB+nD)] from the bulletin board, and
verify the decryption proofs pideci for each of the
shuffled ballots β′′i .
(e) Let vid′i and m′i be the plaintexts verified in the
previous step. Group the ballots by voter identi-
fier into ballot groups G j. For each group G j, find
ballot β j∗ with the highest ballot index, recompute
τ=∏
χ j
k=1 τik , and verify the reencryption proof pi
sel
j .
(f) Let SD be the selected votes [V 1, . . . ,V κ] and S ′D =
[V ′1, . . . ,V
′
κ] the shuffled and randomized votes.
Verify the shuffle proof pi′σ for SD and S ′D.
(g) Finally, for each i ∈ D verify that V ′i =
Vote.ZEnc(pkT;ri) and that S = [SD[i] | i /∈D].
If any of the checks fail, it returns ⊥, and > otherwise.
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Procedure 8 (Verify). Any party can verify the result r and
proof Π against the public bulletin board. To do so, they
proceed as follows:
1. Verify that the TS operated honestly by running the
VerifyFilter() algorithm. If VerifyFilter returns ⊥, then
return > if (r,Π) = (⊥,⊥), otherwise return ⊥.
2. Given the selected votes S , return the result of
Vote.VerifyTally(pkT,S ,r,Π).
4.3 Hiding revoting patterns with dummies
We now describe a dummy generation strategy designed to
protect voters from the 1009 attack [38]. In this attack, the
coercer forces a voter to cast a specific number of ballots
and looks for a group of that size in the filtering step. If
such group does not exist, the coerced voter has revoted. Our
dummy generation algorithm adds dummy ballots and dummy
voters to ensure that the coercer cannot determine the size of
the voters’ ballot groups.
We illustrate our algorithm in Figure 4, in a scenario where,
the coercer forces voter A to cast 2 ballots. At the end of
the election phase the coercer observes 4 ballots and must
determine whether A revoted (situation 2) or not (situation 1).
Without dummies, distinguishing these situations is trivial: if
A revoted there is a group of 3 ballots and one of 1 ballot, and
there are two groups of 2 ballots otherwise. We add dummy
ballots and voters to make both situations look identical. The
idea is to find a cover of ballots that could result from both
situations. For instance, adding to either situation two dummy
voters that cast four dummy ballots total yields groups of 1,
2, 2, and 3 ballots. This observation makes both situations
indistinguishable for the coercer (Figure 4, right).
To ensure that the cover is independent from the voters’ real
actions, its appearance must only depend on the information
available to the coercer: (1) the number of ballots nB posted
by users to the bulletin board; and (2) the number of voters ν
that cast a ballot. The goal of the dummy generation strategy
is to allocate dummy ballots such that the adversary observes
the same cover regardless of the actual distributions of the nB
ballots over ν voters.
Consider the case of two voters, i.e., ν= 2, and 9 ballots,
i.e., nB = 9. As the filtering stage only reveals the sizes of
the groupings and not their relation to voters the possible
adversary’s observations are (1,8),(2,7),(3,6), and (4,5).
To cover all these scenarios one needs 8 voters (6 of which
are dummy) casting 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8 ballots, for a total
of 36−9 = 27 dummy ballots.
We add dummy ballots to real voters as well to re-
duce the number of group sizes that are possible. For ex-
ample, in the previous scenario one can pad the cases
(1,8),(2,7),(3,6),(4,5) to (1,8),(2,8),(4,8),(4,8). This
can be covered with a cover containing voters with 1,2,4,8
ballots each. Building this cover only requires 2 dummy vot-
ers and 15−9 = 6 dummy ballots. We stress that the number
Situation 1
A: 2 ballots
B: 2 ballots
Situation 2
A: 3 ballots
B: 1 ballots
Original
ballots
Dummy
addition
Cover
(coercer observation)
Figure 4: The original ballots’ groups ( ) create distinguish-
able situations. Adding 2 dummy voters casting a total of 4
dummy ballots ( ), the situations become indistinguishable.
of added dummy ballots is independent of how the real ballots
are actually distributed among the two voters.
Finding a cover. Formally, a cover is a set C = {(si,zi)}i
formed by groupings (si,zi) ∈ Z+×Z+. Here, si is the size
of the ballot groups within that grouping, and zi is the upper
bound on the number of times that such a ballot group can
occur in any distribution of the nB real ballots among real
voters. We aim to find a cover of minimal size |C|= ∑i si · zi
to minimize the number of dummies added.
A sufficient cover. We derive an upper bound on the amount of
dummies required to build a cover. We do not use the number
of real voters for this bound. Let nB be the number of real
ballots on the PBB. For simplicity, assume padded group sizes
are powers of two, i.e., si = 2i for i≥ 0. Given nB ballots, any
distribution can have at most z0 = nB groups of size s0 = 1
(one ballot per voter). Similarly, any distribution can have
at most z1 = bnB/2c groups of size s1 = 2. Recall we pad
ballot groups to the next bigger size, so a ballot group of 3
would be padded to one of size s2 = 4 ballots, therefore z2 =
bnB/3c. More generally, there can be at most zi = bnB/(2i−1+
1)c groups of si = 2i ballots. The biggest possible group (if
all ballots were cast by the same voter), has size 2dlog2 nBe.
Therefore, the size of the cover |C| is bounded by:
|C|=
dlog2 nBe
∑
i=0
zi · si = nB+
dlog2 nBe
∑
i=1
2i
⌊
nB
2i−1+1
⌋
≤ nB+
dlog2 nBe
∑
i=1
2i
2i−1+1
nB ≤ nB+
dlog2 nBe
∑
i=1
2nB
= (1+2dlog2 nBe)nB.
An efficient cover. Knowing the number of real voters ν en-
ables to obtain a tighter cover. Consider the previous ex-
ample with ν = 2 and nB = 9. If we only consider nB = 9,
one of the possible distributions of votes would be having
s1 = b9/2c = 4 groups of size 2. However, knowing ν = 2
rules out this possibility. There can be at most one group of
size two: if there were 2 groups, each of the 2 voters could
only cast 2 ballots, i.e., 4 ballots in total. However, we know
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there are 9 ballots so at least one voter has voted more than
twice, implying that s1 = 1.
When the number of ballots grows this reasoning becomes
intractable. Consider ballot groups with group sizes, s = ki
for i ∈ [0, . . . ,dlogk nBe] for a real number k > 1. We assume
that nB > ν, otherwise the cover would be trivial: C= {(s0 =
1,z0 = ν)}. We compute the cover as follows.
1. Consider groups of size s0 = k0 = 1. As nB > ν, at least
one voter must cast more than one ballot, resulting in
(s0,z0) = (1,ν−1).
2. Consider groups of size si = ki. We know that given
nB, there can be at most αi = bnB/(ki−1 + 1)c groups
of size ki. The number of groups is also bound by the
number of voters. If ν · si ≥ nB then all ballots can be
assigned to the ν voters given groups of maximum size
si, and we set νi = ν, otherwise set νi = ν− 1 so that
one voter is not in this grouping. Finally, we need at
least zi(ki−1+1) ballots to make zi groups, but we must
have enough ballots left over to make ν groups in total,
i.e., nB ≥ zi(ki−1+1)+(ν− zi). Rewriting gives bound
βi = b(nB−ν)/ki−1c. We set zi = min(αi,νi,βi).
Assuming nB > ν, the cover has |C|= ∑dlogk nBei=0 zisi > nB bal-
lots, necessitating dummy ballots, and ∑dlogk nBei=1 zi > ν groups,
necessitating dummy voters.
Creating dummy voters and allocating dummy ballots.
The TS recovers all voter identifiers vid by decrypting the γis,
and the corresponding ballot indices by decrypting the Iis.
So far, we assumed that ballot index sequences are contin-
uous. However, there can be gaps if some tokens were not
used (e.g., the coercer does not use some tokens to identify
index gaps in the filtering phase). The TS first requests the
number of obtained tokens n′B from the PA, and adds exactly
n′B−nB dummy ballots to fill up any gaps, such that n′B equals
the number of obtained tokens. The TS can create a dummy
ballot for voter vid by setting γ= EC.Enc(pkTS,vid).
Given the current number of ballots n′B and the number of
real voters ν the TS computes a cover C= {(si,zi)}i. To this
end the TS performs a search to find the best k, i.e., the one
that gives the smaller cover. In our experiments in Section 6,
k tends to be in the 2 to 4 range, and the search takes less than
a second. The TS performs the following steps:
1. For every voter vid j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,ν} with t ballots, let
(si,zi) ∈ C be the cover group with the smallest size si
such that si ≥ t. To ensure that dummy ballots are never
counted, the TS adds t− si dummy votes to vid j with
descending (and unused) ballot counters smaller than
the last cast vote by this voter.
2. For each grouping (si,zi) ∈ C let z′i be the number of real
voters that were assigned to this group. The TS adds
zi− z′i dummy voters. For each dummy voter, it picks
a random vid and initial ballot index m and creates si
dummy ballots with increasing ballot indices.
In total, the TS adds nD = |C|−nB dummies. Given nB ballots
on the bulletin board, nB+nD = O(nB lognB), see the upper
bound above. As the filtering phases is linear in nB+nD the
time complexity of O(nB lognB) follows.
5 Security Analysis
We analyze VOTEAGAIN’s ballot privacy, verifiability,
and coercion resistance. We follow Bernhard et al. [7]
and model the trustees as a single trusted party with keys
(pkT,skT), but we note that the result holds when trustees
are distributed. We explicitly model the bulletin board
PBB as an append only string BB. To ease modeling, we
use the following redefinition of our voting scheme V =
(Setup,GetToken,Vote,Valid,Filter,VerifyFilter,Tally,Verify)
where the algorithms output changes to the bulletin board
rather than posting to it directly. While Bernhard et al. model
voter registration implicitly, we make the registration step
explicit using the GetToken function because it forms an
integral part of our voting scheme and may happen more than
once. The redefined algorithms in V are as follows:
• Setup(1`,E ,C ) as in Setup in procedure 1 but explic-
itly returns the public key pk = (pkPA,pkTS,pkT) and the
corresponding private keys skPA,skTS,skT.
• GetToken(i) returns a token τ as in GetToken() in proce-
dure 2.
• Vote(τ,c) returns β as in Vote(τ,c) in procedure 3 but
does not post the ballot to the bulletin board. Moreover,
the voter first verifies the token τ as in step 4 of proce-
dure 2, and returns ⊥ if it does not validate.
• Valid(BB,β) returns the result of Valid(β) in procedure 4
with respect to the bulletin board BB.
• Filter(BB,n′B,skTS) as in Filter in procedure 5, but takes
the number of registrations n′B as explicit input, and re-
turns S ‖Φ instead of adding them to the board.
• VerifyFilter(BB,S ,Φ) runs VerifyFilter from procedure 7
on BB′ = BB ‖ S ‖Φ and returns the result.
• Tally(BB,skT) returns (r,Π) as in Tally in procedure 6.
• Verify(BB,r,Π) is as in Verify in procedure 8 operating
on the bulletin board BB ‖ r ‖Π.
5.1 Ballot privacy
We base our ballot privacy definition on the game-based defi-
nition by Bernhard et al. [7]. They model ballot privacy using
an indistinguishability game which simultaneously tracks two
bulletin boards, BB0 for the “real” world and BB1 for the
“fake” world. Only one is accessible to the adversary (see Fig-
ure 5). The adversary, controlling the polling authority (PA)
and the tally server (TS),needs to determine whether the tally
was evaluated over the “real” or “fake” world. It can decide
how voters vote. Formally, the adversary can make calls to
the oracle OvoteLR(τ,c0,c1) to let a user with token τ cast a
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Expbpriv,bA ,V (`,E ,C ):
(pk,skPA,skTS,skT)← Setup(1`,E ,C )
b← AO(pk,skPA,skTS)
Output b′
OvoteLR(τ,c0,c1):
Let β0 = Vote(τ,c0) and β1 = Vote(τ,c1)
If Valid(BBb,βb) =⊥ return ⊥
Else BB0← BB0 ‖ β0 and BB1← BB1 ‖ β1
Ocast(β):
If Valid(BBb,β) =⊥ return ⊥
Else BB0← BB0 ‖ β and BB1← BB1 ‖ β
Oboard():
return BBb
Otally(S ,Φ)
If VerifyFilter(BBb,S ,Φ) =⊥ return ⊥
BBb← BBb ‖ S ‖Φ
BB1−b← BB1−b ‖ Filter(BB1−b, |BB1−b|,skTS)
(r,Π0)← Tally(BB0,skT)
Π1 = SimTally(BB1,r)
return (r,Πb)
Figure 5: In the ballot privacy experiment Expbpriv,bA ,V ,
the adversary A has access to the oracles O =
{OvoteLR,Ocast,Oboard,Otally}. The adversary controls
the TS and the PA. It can call Otally only once.
vote for candidate c0 on BB0 and a vote for c1 on BB1; and
to the oracle Ocast(β) to cast ballots β (constructed by the
adversary) on BB0 and BB1. Because the adversary controls
the PA, it can create as many voting tokens as it needs.
The outcome of the election is always computed on the real
bulletin board BB0. The adversary can once ask to compute
the outcome by calling the oracle Otally(S ,Φ) where S , Φ
is the output of Filter computed by the adversary. The tally
oracle aborts if S ,Φ is not valid. If the adversary saw the
“real” result corresponding to BB0, the tally protocol proceeds
as normal and publishes a correct tally proof Π with respect
to BB0. If the adversary saw the “fake” bulletin board BB1,
the experiment simulates the tally proof Π with respect to
BB1 using the algorithm SimTally and returns the real result r.
Definition 4. Consider a voting scheme V = (Setup,
GetToken,Vote,Valid,Filter,VerifyFilter,Tally,Verify) for an
electoral roll E and candidate list C . We say the scheme
has ballot privacy if there exists an algorithm SimTally such
that for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A∣∣∣Pr[Expbpriv,0A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]− Pr[Expbpriv,1A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]∣∣∣
is a negligible function in `.
Theorem 1. VOTEAGAIN provides ballot privacy under the
DDH assumption in the random oracle model. (Proof in Ap-
pendix A)
Bernhard et al. [7] also define strong consistency, to ensure
that the result r does not leak information about individual
ballots, and strong correctness to ensure that valid ballots are
never refused by the bulletin board. We restate these notions
and prove that VOTEAGAIN satisfies them in Appendix A.
5.2 Coercion resistance
Coercion resistance means that a coercer should not be able
to determine whether a coerced user submitted to coercion
– assuming it cannot learn this by seeing the result of the
election (e.g., if there are zero votes for the selected candi-
date, the coercer knows the coerced user did not submit). In
VOTEAGAIN, this means that the coercer should not be able
to determine whether a coerced user voted again, or not.
Existing coercion resistant models are insufficient. Juels,
Catalano and Jakobsson (JCJ) model coercion resistance by
comparing a real-world game with an ideal game [31]. In
JCJ, voters evade coercion by providing the coercer with a
fake credential. The real-world models normal execution. The
adversary plays the role of the coercer and chooses a set of
corrupted voters and identifies the coerced voter. Then, the
honest voters cast their ballots (or abstain). If the coerced
voter does not submit she also casts her true ballot. Thereafter,
the adversary is given the credentials of all corrupt users, a
credential for the coerced voter (which is fake if that voter
resists), and the current bulletin board. The adversary can
now cast more ballots. Upon seeing the result and the tally
proof the adversary decides if the coerced voter submitted.
In the ideal game, the adversary is not shown the content
of the bulletin board, and she is given the true credential of
the coerced voter and can therefore cast real ballots for the
coerced voter. However, a modified tally function does not
count ballots for the coerced voter cast by the adversary if
the coerced voter resists. Once the election phase is over, the
adversary is shown only the tally result, not the tally proof.
The JCJ model does not work for the revoting setting where
the coerced voter casts another ballot after casting the ballot
under coercion. Achenbach et al. [1] propose a variant in
which the coerced voter acts after the adversary has cast his
votes, revoting if she resists or doing nothing if she submits.
Thereafter, the adversary is shown the new bulletin board and
the resulting tally and proof. In the ideal model, the adversary
is only provided the length of the bulletin board.
The model proposed by Achenbach et al. [1] does not cap-
ture coercion resistance. Following the real/ideal paradigm, in
the ideal game it should hold with overwhelming probability
that the adversary cannot distinguish between a submitting
and a resisting coerced voter. Then, the proof would show
that the adversary cannot learn more in the real world than it
could in the ideal world. However, in the ideal game proposed
by Achenbach et al., the coercion resistance property does
not hold. The adversary can always distinguish between these
two cases by simply observing the length of the bulletin board
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Expcr,bA ,V (`,E ,C ):
(pk,skPA,skTS,skT)← Setup(1`,E ,C )
Create PA0 and PA1 with keys pk0PA,pk
1
PA
b′← AO(pk,pkbPA,pk1−bPA )
Output b′
OvoteLR(i0,c0, i1,c1):
Let τ0← PA0.GetToken(i0) and τ1← PA1.GetToken(i1)
Let β0 = Vote(τ0,c0) and β1 = Vote(τ1,c1)
If Valid(BBb,βb) =⊥ return ⊥
Else BB0← BB0 ‖ β0 and BB1← BB1 ‖ β1
Ogettoken(i):
Let τ0← PA0.GetToken(i) and τ1← PA1.GetToken(i)
return τ= τb,τ′ = τ1−b
Ocast(β,β′):
Let βb← β and β1−b← β′
If Valid(BB0,β0) =⊥ or Valid(BB1,β1) =⊥ return ⊥
Else BB0← BB0 ‖ β0 and BB1← BB1 ‖ β1
Oboard():
return BBb
Otally()
Let n′B be the number of tokens obtained from PA0.
Let S0,Φ0 = Filter(BB0,n′B,skTS)
Let (r,Π0)← Tally(BB0 ‖ S0 ‖Φ0,skT)
Let (S1,Φ1)← SimFilter(BB1,n′B,r)
Let BB0← BB0 ‖ S0 ‖Φ0 and BB1← BB1 ‖ S1 ‖Φ1
Π1 = SimTally(BB1,r)
return (r,Πb)
Figure 6: In the coercion resistance experiment Expcr,bA ,V , adversary A has access to oracles O = {OvoteLR,Ogettoken,Ocast,
Oboard,Otally}. It can call Otally only once, thereafter it can see the result Φb by using Oboard().
(which increases by one ballot if the coerced voter revotes).
Therefore, any proofs in this model say nothing about whether
the real scheme offers coercion resistance. While the Achen-
bach et al. [1] scheme seems to be coercion resistant, coercion
resistance does not follow from the proof in their model.
Finally, the model by Achenbach et al. does not capture the
leakage resulting from the state kept by the voter, or as in our
protocol, by the polling authority. Our protocol deliberately
hides the ballot counter from the voter, so that when if the co-
ercer coerces the voter again, it cannot determine whether the
coerced voter re-voted based on this counter. In Achenbach et
al.’s model, the coercer cannot coerce a voter more than once.
A new coercion resistance definition. We propose a new
game-based coercion resistance definition inspired by Bern-
hard et al.’s ballot privacy definition. The game tracks two
bulletin boards, BB0 and BB1, of which only one is accessible
to the adversary (depending on the bit b). We ensure that re-
gardless of the bit b, the same number of ballots are added to
the bulletin board. The goal of the adversary is to determine
b (see Figure 6). Recall that we assume that the PA, TS, and
trustees are honest with respect to coercion resistance.
To model submits versus resists, we provide the adversary
with anOvoteLR(i0,c0, i1,c1) oracle to let voter i0, a “coerced”
voter, cast a vote for candidate c0 in BB0, and voter i1, any
other voter, cast a vote for candidate c1 in BB1. The adversary
is allowed to make this call multiple times. Regardless of the
value of b, every call to OvoteLR results in a single ballot
being added to each BB. This prevents the trivial win in the
Achenbach et al. model. Since the polling authority keeps
state, we work with two PAs: PA0 and PA1.
We model a coercion attack as follows. The adversary can
cast votes using any user by calling Ogettoken(i) to obtain
a voting token τ for voter i on the board that it can see, and
a token τ′ for the other board. It can then run β= Vote(τ,c)
and β′ = Vote(τ′,c) itself to create ballots for candidate c,
on both boards and cast them using Ocast(β,β′). Note that
per our assumptions, the adversary does not get access to the
voter’s means of authentication. Moreover, we require that
the adversary always casts valid ballots to both boards (but
the encoded candidate need not be the same).
Finally, the adversary can make one call to Otally() which
performs the filtering step and returns the result r (always
computed on BB0) and the tally proof. The result of Filter is
accessible using Oboard. To correct for leakage stemming
from the tally result, as in the ballot privacy game, we simulate
the filter and tally proofs if the adversary sees BB1.
This game models all the coercion attacks applicable to
VOTEAGAIN:
• The 1009 attack. The adversary casts a ballot as co-
erced voter i0 using τ,τ′=Ogettoken(i0), β=Vote(τ,c),
β′ = Vote(τ′,c) and then Ocast(β,β′) 1009 times. (Both
boards now contain 1009 ballots by voter i0.) Then it
calls OvoteLR(i0,c, i1,c). If b = 0 the coerced voter
revotes for candidate c on BB0, otherwise it does not,
and the alternative voter casts a ballot for candidate c on
BB1 visible to the adversary. Note that if the result of
Filter Φ reveals the size of a group of ballots, the adver-
sary can win this game (SimFilter does not model this
leakage as it only gets n′B and r as input).
• Returning coercer. Let voter i0 be the coerced voter. First
the coercer runs τ,τ′ =GetToken(i0), β= Vote(τ,c) and
β′ = Vote(τ′,c), and Ocast(β,β′) to cast one vote as the
coerced user on both boards and to observe the token
τ corresponding to the board BBb it can see. Then it
runs OvoteLR(i0,c0, i1,c1), causing i0 to cast a vote on
the bulletin board BBb if b = 0, and i1 to casts a vote
on BBb if b = 1. Thereafter, it can examine the state by
running τ,τ′ = GetToken(i0) again. If the new token τ
leaks whether voter i0 voted again (on board BBb), then
the adversary wins the coercion resistance game.
Definition 5. Consider a voting scheme V = (Setup,
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GetToken,Vote,Filter,VerifyFilter,Tally,Verify) for an elec-
toral roll E and candidate list C . We say the scheme has
coercion resistance if there exist algorithms SimFilter and
SimTally such that for all probabilistic polynomial time adver-
saries A∣∣∣Pr[Expcr,0A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]−Pr[Expcr,1A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]∣∣∣
is a negligible function in `.
Theorem 2. VOTEAGAIN provides coercion resistance un-
der the DDH assumption in the random oracle model. (Proof
in Appendix B.)
5.3 Verifiability
In their analysis, Achenbach et al. [1] adapt the correctness
definition of Juels et al. [31] to the revoting setting. However,
Achenbach et al.’s model does not take into account that vot-
ers may not check that their ballots are cast correctly, nor that
newer ballots should supersede older ballots even if voters
have been coerced or corrupted. To address these cases, we
adapt the qualitative game-based verifiability definition of
Cortier et al. [14] – which accounts for a malicious bulletin
board and voters not checking their ballots – to our setting by
adding the GetToken function and explicitly modeling revot-
ing. As in Cortier et al. [14], our game does not model voter’s
intent, and assumes that the voting hardware, i.e., the device
and software running Vote, is honest. We refer to Cortier et
al. [15] for a formal process-based computational model that
does model verifiability with voter intent. We note that the
correctness definition by Juels et al. [31] was renamed to
’verifiability’ by Cortier et al. [14], and therefore any model
satisfying the latter satisfies the former.
In a nutshell, a voting scheme is verifiable [14] if for nC
corrupt voters, the result of the election always includes: (1)
all votes by honest voters that verified whether their ballots
were cast correctly, (2) at most nC corrupted votes, and (3) a
subset of the votes by honest voters that did not check if their
ballots were cast correctly. These conditions ensure that while
a malicious bulletin board can drop ballots of voters that do
not check, it can insert at most nC new votes.
Extending the current verifiability definition. We extend
the definition presented by Cortier et al. [14] for the re-voting
setting to explicitly consider the number of votes cast by a
voter, see Figure 7. The PA is honest, but the adversary con-
trols the bulletin board, the TS, and the trustees. The system
implicitly tracks the number of tokens #tokens(i) that have
been obtained by voter i. The game tracks when each voter
is corrupted in a (initially empty) list of corruption events
C, and tracks the honest votes in HVote. The adversary can
call two oracles: Ovote(i,c) to request that honest voter i
outputs a ballot for candidate c, and Ogettoken(i) to get a
voting token for user i. Note that this models both corruption
and coercion of voter i. After a call to Ogettoken(i), voter i
is considered corrupted until it casts an honest ballot using
Ovote(i,c). Eventually, the adversary outputs a bulletin board
BB, the selected votes S and proof Φ, the election outcome
r ∈ R, and a tally proof Π (line 3). The adversary loses if Φ
or Π do not verify (line 4). If it verifies, the adversary wins if
the result does not satisfy the three intuitive conditions above.
The game computes the following groups of voters:
• Corrupted (line 6): voters considered corrupted, i.e., vot-
ers that were once corrupted (by calling Ogettoken) and
thereafter never cast a checked honest vote.
• Checked (line 7): voters that verified a ballot and were
not corrupted thereafter.
• Unchecked (line 8): voters that were never corrupted, but
did not check their ballots either.
The game computes allowed candidates for honest voters:
• AllowedVotes[i] (line 9) A list of candidates that voter
i honestly voted for in or after the last checked ballot.
If voter i never checked a ballot, this list includes all
candidates this voter ever voted for.
The adversary wins if the result r verifies but violates any
of the following conditions (lines 10–13): (1) For each honest
voter that verified a ballot and was not thereafter corrupted
(i.e., voters in Checked) the result should include either the
candidate in that ballot, or a candidate in a later ballot. This
corresponds to the candidates {cVi }nVi=1 in the game. (2) Of
the honest voters that did not check their ballots but were
never corrupted (i.e., voters in Unchecked), at most one can-
didate that the honest voter voted for (in any ballot) can be
included. This corresponds to the candidates {cUi }nUi=1 in the
game, where nU can be smaller than |Unchecked| or in fact
0. (3) At most nC corrupted (or bad) votes were counted (i.e.,
the candidates {cBi }nBi=1)
In the game, the sum of these choices is modeled by the
tallying function ρ¯ : C ∗ → R that maps the voter’s choices
in C to an election result in R. This function should support
partial tallying, i.e., for any two lists S1 and S2 we have that
ρ¯(S1∪S2)= ρ¯(S1)?R ρ¯(S2) for a commutative binary operator
?R : R×R→ R. Note that a tally function that outputs the
number of votes per candidate naturally admits partial tallying.
Definition 6. Consider a voting scheme V = (Setup,
GetToken,Vote,Filter,VerifyFilter,Tally,Verify) for an elec-
toral roll E and candidate list C . We say the scheme is verifi-
able if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversary A∣∣∣Pr[Expver,0A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]−Pr[Expver,1A ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1]∣∣∣
is a negligible function in `.
Theorem 3. VOTEAGAIN is verifiable under the DDH as-
sumption in the random oracle model. (Proof in Abstract C).
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0 Expver,bA ,V (`,E ,C ):
1 (pk,skPA,skTS,skT)← Setup(1`,E ,C )
2 Set HVote← /0 and C← /0
3 (BB,S ,Φ,r,Π)← AO(pk,skTS,skT)
4 If VerifyFilter(BB,S ,Φ) =⊥ or Verify(BB ‖ S ‖Φ,r,Π) =⊥ return 0
5 Let Verified = {(i1,ctr1), . . . ,(iλ,ctrλ)} correspond to checked ballots.
6 Let Corrupted = {i | (i,ctr) ∈ C∧∀(i,ctr′) ∈ Verified : ctr′ < ctr}
7 Let Checked = {i | (i,_) ∈ Verified}\Corrupted
8 Let Unchecked = {i | (i,_,_) ∈ HVote∧ (i,_) 6∈ C}\Checked
9 Let AllowedVotes[i] = {c | (i,ctr,c) ∈ HVote s.t. ∀(i,ctr′) ∈ Verified : ctr≥ ctr′}
10 If ∃ cV1 , . . . ,cVnV s.t. c j ∈ AllowedVotes[iVj ] where Checked = {iV1 , . . . , iVnV }
11 ∃ (iU1 ,cU1 ), . . . ,(inU ,cUnU ) s.t. iUj ∈ Unchecked,cUj ∈ AllowedVotes[iUj ], iUj different
12 ∃ cB1 , . . . ,cBnB ∈ C s.t. 0≤ nB ≤ |Corrupted|
13 s.t. r = ρ¯({cVi }nVi=1)?R ρ¯({cUi }nUi=1)?R ρ¯({cBi }nBi=1)
14 Then return 0, otherwise return 1
Ovote(i,c):
Let τ= GetToken(i)
Add (i,#tokens(i),c) to HVote
Return Vote(τ,c)
Ogettoken(i):
Let τ= GetToken(i)
Add (i,#tokens(i)) to C
return τ
Figure 7: In the verifiability game experiment Expver,bA ,V , the adversary A has access to the oracles O = {Ogettoken,Ovote}.
6 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of VOTEAGAIN using a Python
prototype implementation of its cryptographic operations. We
do not include in our evaluation the setup, token acquisition
or the bulletin board. We give details of what was imple-
mented further in the section. We use the petlib [16] binding
to OpenSSL for the group operations using the fast NIST
P-256 curve. We ran all experiments in Linux on a single core
of an Intel i3-8100 processor running at 3.60GHz. We expect
nation-wide elections to have much more processing power
available. For example, the Swiss CHVote system, which aims
to support 8 million voters, has around 32 cores available per
party in the system. We also include performance estimates of
running the system on a large machine with 8 Intel Xeon Plat-
inum 8280L processors, with 28 cores each, running at 2.7Ghz.
As our scheme is almost completely parallelizable (only the
hash functions for the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
need to be computed sequentially), we estimate a 90% paral-
lelization gain: a speedup of 170 times when using the 8x28
cores with respect to the single core.
For all experiments we empirically select the best cover
size k by sweeping over values from 1 to 64. In the majority
of cases the optimal k is in the range [2,4].
Creating a ballot. We use an ElGamal ciphertext to encrypt
the voter’s choice, and a Bayer and Groth [5] zero-knowledge
proof of membership to show that the selected candidate is
eligible. Creating a ballot from 1000 eligible candidates costs
1.6 seconds, while verifying its correctness costs 0.24 seconds.
The size of the proof, using compressed representation of
elliptic curve points, is 1.5 KB.
Impact of revoting. Figure 8 shows the overhead, in terms of
number of dummies per real ballot depending on the number
of votes. This overhead influences the computation time of
shuffling and filtering in the tally phase. We consider differ-
ent revoting behavior. In the leftmost figure we model this
behaviour as percentage of the number of voters: 50% models
that half of the voters revoted once, and 200% models that all
voters vote twice. We note that the overhead of 100% voters
revoting once is equivalent to, for example, 25% of the voters
revoting 4 times. As expected, the overhead increases with
both the number of voters and the number of revoted ballots.
However, even for 100 million voters revoting twice (200%
revotes), the overhead is at most a factor of 32 (Figure 8 left).
However, casting a vote takes time. Thus, revoting patterns
are constrained by the number of ballots that can be cast dur-
ing an election. We consider an election period of 24h (larger
than most countries), and bound how often a single voter can
vote (1 ballot per second, per ten seconds, and per minute).
As this limits the number of voters with a large amount of
ballots, we do not need large covers, reducing the overhead
(see Figure 8, center). Similarly, assuming that all voters will
revote is very conservative. In a normal election one expects
the vast majority of voters to vote once. In Figure 8, right,
we show the overhead when the number of voters that cast
more than one vote is limited. As fewer voters revote, the total
amount of votes is smaller and so are the covers.
Filtering. We implemented a non-optimized version of Bayer-
Groths verifiable shuffle protocol [4] to implement item 3 of
Filter. Moreover, we implemented non-interactive proof of
correct decryption and correct re-ecryption (steps 4 and 5 of
Procedure 5 respectively). We measure the execution time of
filtering and verifiying, when varying the number of voters.
Figure 9 left shows the times to run Filter and VerifyFilter on
a single core machine. Figure 9 middle shows the estimated
processing times on the big 8 processor Xeon machine. We
estimate that the 8 processor machine can filter and tally the
second round presidential election in Brazil (147 million reg-
istered voters) in 95 minutes if no voter revotes, within a day
assuming 50% extra ballots and at most one ballot per voter
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Note that one ballot per voter causes the highest processing time.
per ten seconds. We note that elections usually tally ballots
per state, city, or smaller electoral district. Thus, in general
we expect the number of ballots to be much smaller. All ballot
groups in Figure 9 left and center have size one. Figure 9 right
shows the effect of larger ballot groups resulting from revot-
ing and dummy voters. As the average group size increases,
the computation time goes down. Therefore, Figure 9 gives
an upper bound on the processing time, given a known cover
size.
For comparison we computed a lower bound on the fil-
ter cost of Achenbach et al.’s filter method by counting the
number of group operations needed per ballot. We used this
number to compute the estimate in Figure 9 left. A small-town
election with 100.000 ballots takes 8 core months to filter in
their scheme. Even on the large Xeon machine, an election
with 1 million ballots takes over four months to complete. Our
method needs respectively 10 core minutes and 30 seconds.
The size of the tallying proofs for our scheme following these
examples would be of 54 and 501 MB respectively. Note
that reducing the scale over which ballots are tallied does not
solve the problem. Excluding the cost of having such ded-
icated servers per area, the biggest Paris neighborhood has
200.000 inhabitants, making it unusable even if the tally is
divided per neighborhood.
Tallying. We also measured the execution time of a single
step of the mix network – a single shuffle and one verifiable
decryption – using our verifiable shuffle implementation. Our
results show that one step is a factor of three times faster
than our filter protocol, e.g., mix-and-decrypting the 100.000
ballots takes around 3 core minutes and 1 million ballots takes
10 seconds in the Xeon machine.
7 Overview and discussion
As we have seen from existing literature, building a coercion
resistant protocol requires strong assumptions and trade-offs.
In this section we aim to present the reasons behind our choice
of using re-voting as a solution to fight coercion resistance.
First of all, we believe that re-voting is an easy to understand
solution, that requires no extra devices, memorization, interac-
tion with several entities during registration, or even lying to
achieve coercion resistance. In fact, Estonian elections have
used a re-voting model for years [28] with a participation of
44% of the electorate having used internet voting [17]. Sec-
ondly, it allows to build a construction that does not require
voters to securely store cryptographic material, allowing a
vote cast from any device. This further reduces the possibil-
ity of coercion attacks by confiscating the device where the
credentials are stored.
Another key point is on the assumption of when the coercer
14
needs to be absent. Fake credentials solutions assume that
the coercer is absent during registration and at some point
during the voting phase. On the other hand, re-voting assumes
that a voter escaping coercion will be able to cast the last
vote. In the case of a remote registration process, a targeted
attack will most likely succeed in both scenarios. However,
performing a large scale attack scales much better in the fake-
credential setting: coercers have the entire pre-election period
(e.g., 24 days in Spain) to coerce a voter at any point during
the registration. Contrarily, in the re-voting setting coercers
have only a few minutes before the election closes to produce
this attack (it requires physical presence with voters to be
effective).
The assumptions we make in our construction (mainly over
the PA and TS) are motivated by the trade-offs achieved. On
the one hand, we do not require users to keep a cryptographic
state, which is achieved by assuming the PA is honest with
regards to coercion resistance. On the other hand, we assume
an honest TS with respect to coercion resistance to achieve
quasilinear filtering.
8 Conclusion
Due to its complexity and cost, coercion resistance has been
often overlooked in remote voting schemes. We introduced
VOTEAGAIN, a revoting scheme that enables cleartext filter-
ing thanks to efficient deterministic padding. VOTEAGAIN
does not require users to store cryptographic material, and
can efficiently handle millions of votes. We provided a new
coercion resistance definition and updated existing definitions
for ballot privacy and verifiability to the revoting setting. We
have proven that VOTEAGAIN satisfies all of them.
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A Proof of ballot privacy, strong correctness
and strong consistency
Proof of theorem 1. This proof is very similar to the proof
of ballot privacy of Helios in the full version of Bernhard et
al. [6]. We start with the adversary playing the ballot privacy
game with b = 0 and after a sequence of game steps transi-
tions, the adversary finishes playing the ballot privacy game
with b = 1. We argue that each of these steps are indistin-
guishable, and therefore the results follows.
The proof proceeds along the following sequence of games:
Game G0. Let game G0 be the Expbpriv,0A ,V game (see Figure 5
and Definition 4).
Game G1. Game G1 is as in G0 but we now compute
Π0 = SimTally(BB0,r)
by simulating the proof using the random oracle instead
of using the real proof from Tally(BB0,skT). Because of
the simulation properties of the zero-knowledge proof
system, A cannot distinguish these two games.
Game G2. As in game G1, but now Otally(S ,Φ) ignores S
and Φ provided by A when computing the result r. In
particular, Otally now proceeds as follows:
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Otally(S ,Φ)
If VerifyFilter(BBb,S ,Φ) =⊥ return ⊥
(r,Π0)← Tally(BB0 ‖ Filter(BB0,n′B,skTS),skT)
BBb← BBb ‖ S ‖Φ
BB1−b← BB1−b ‖ Filter(BB1−b,n′B, tssk)
Π0 = SimTally(BB0,r)
Π1 = SimTally(BB1,r)
return (r,Πb)
The proofs included in Φ ensure that A honestly com-
puted the filtering step. Therefore, the adversary’s view
is indistinguishable from that in G1.
Game G3. As in game G2, but in Oboard we return BB1.
Note that in G3 the adversary has the same view as in
the Expbpriv,1A ,V game. All that is left to show is that G2 and
G3 are indistinguishable.
We now show that no adversary A can distinguish G2 from
G3. Let nO be the number of OvoteLR(τ,c0,c1) calls that the
adversary A made. In particular, for the ith call to OvoteLR,
remember the tuple (β0,β1,c0,c1) of candidates and result-
ing ballots. We now build a series of games H0, . . . ,HnO and
proceed by a hybrid argument.
In game Hi we show to the adversary a bulletin board where
the first i ballots cast using OvoteLR on BB0 are replaced by
those of BB1. More precisely, in all games Hi we keep track of
an additional bulletin board BB that is shown to the adversary,
i.e., Oboard now returns BB. Whenever the adversary makes
an Ocast(β) query, we also add β to BB, i.e., BB← BB ‖ β.
In game Hi in response to the first i calls to OvoteLR, we
additionally set BB← BB ‖ β1. For the remaining calls we
additionally set BB← BB ‖ β0. Note that H0 = G2 and that
HnO = G3.
From Bernhard et al.’s work on Helios [8] we know that in
the random oracle model under the DDH assumption the
ballot encryption scheme based on ElGamal with a non-
interactive proof of correct construction is NM-CPA secure,
that is,∣∣∣Pr[Expnm-cpa,0A (`) = 1]−Pr[Expnm-cpa,1A (`) = 1]∣∣∣
is negligible in `, where Expnm-cpa,bA is as in Figure 10. We
reduce to the NM-CPA security of the encryption scheme to
show that Hi is indistinguishable from Hi−1.
To show this, we create an adversary B against NM-CPA.
Internally, B uses adversary A . Adversary B receives the
public key pk from its challenger. At the start of the game
B runs Setup as normal, but instead it sets pkT = pk. It then
answers the jth OvoteLR(τ,c0,c1) query as follows:
• For j < i it sets BB← BB ‖ β1
• For i = i it returns c0,c1 to the NM-CPA challenger to
receive a challenge ciphertext c∗, and uses that ciphertext
when running Vote to obtain a ballot β∗ and set BB←
BB ‖ β∗.
Expnm-cpa,bA (`):
(pk,sk)← Vote.KeyGen(1`)
m0,m1← A(“find”,pk)
c∗ = Vote.Enc(pk,mb)
b′← AOdec(“guess”,pk,c∗)
Output b′
Odec(~c):
If c∗ ∈~c then return ⊥
~mi = Vote.Dec(sk,~ci)
Return ~m
Figure 10: In the NM-CPA experiment Expbpriv,bA ,V , the adver-
sary A finds two messages m0 and m1 of which it asks an
encryption of the challenger. It is then allowed to ask the
decryption of a vector of ciphertexts~c of its decryption oracle
Odec. It may only call this oracle once.
• For j > i it sets BB← BB ‖ β0
Thereafter B answers the Otally query as follows. It cannot
directly compute the tally, as it does not know the decryption
key skT. However, it knows skTS so it can recompute the
Filter(BB0,n′B,skTS) to determine which ballots βi1 , . . . ,βiκ
on BB0 should be included in the final tally (recall that the
result is always computed on BB0, and that as per G2 we
do not use Φ provided by the adversary). Then proceed as
follows: Let Γ= (vi1 ,pii1), . . . ,(viκ ,piiκ) be the corresponding
vote ciphertexts and proofs. Then, B computes the result r as
follows:
• If c∗ ∈ Γ, then the ballot for candidate c = c0 in query
i should be included in the tally as well. Recall that
the tally always is computed over BB0, therefore, B sets
(ci1 , . . . ,ciκ−1) = Odec(Γ\{c∗}) and sets
r = ρ¯(ci1 , . . . ,ciκ−1 ,c0).
• Otherwise, B sets (ci1 , . . . ,ciκ) = Odec(Γ \ {c∗}) and
sets
r = ρ¯(ci1 , . . . ,ciκ).
Finally, as in game G2, B simulates the tally proof. Note that
if b = 0 in B’s NM-CPA game, then B perfectly simulates
Hi−1, and if b = 1 then it perfectly simulates Hi. Therefore,
any distinguisher between Hi and Hi−1 breaks the NM-CPA
security of the voting scheme.
A standard hybrid argument now shows that H0 = G2 is
indistinguishable from HnO = G3. This completes the proof.
A.1 Strong Consistency
The ballot privacy definition ensures that ballots and the proof
of correct tallyΠ do not leak anything about how voters voted.
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However, maliciously crafted voting schemes might leak in-
formation about honest votes in the result r itself. To ensure
that this is not possible, Bernhard et al. [7] introduced the
notion of strong consistency. Intuitively, this notion ensures
that the result r is equal to the result function applied directly
to the valid ballots (skipping the filter and tally phase). We fol-
low the exposition of Bernhard et al., but make some changes
to account for the fact that our scheme selects ballots with the
highest corresponding ballot number m, rather than simply
the last per voter.
Our voting scheme depends on a formal result function
ρ : ((G×N)×C )∗→R, where G is the space of voters iden-
tifiers, and R is the result space. Our result function selects,
for every vid ∈G, the ballot ((vid,m),c) where m is the max-
imal counter for this voter. Then it counts the number of votes
per candidate c in the selected ballots and returns the result.
To model that the result r output by Tally is consistent
with the result function ρ, we require the existence of an
extraction algorithm Extract that takes as input the TS’s key
skTS, the trustee key skT and a ballot, and outputs a tuple
((vid,m),c) ∈ ((G×N)×C ) with the corresponding voter
identifier vid, ballot number m and candidate c in this ballot.
If it fails to extract these values, it outputs ⊥.
Moreover, we require a method ValidInd that validates bal-
lots independent of the bulletin board. The function ValidInd
takes as input the election public key pk and a ballot, and
outputs > if the ballot is valid, and ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 7 (Adapted from Bernhard et al. [7]). A voting
scheme V = (Setup,GetToken,Vote,Valid,Filter,VerifyFilter,
Tally,Verify) for an electoral roll E and candidate list C has
strong consistency with respect to a result function ρ : ((G×
N)× C ) if there exists algorithms Extract and ValidInd as
above, such that the following three conditions hold:
1. For any (pk,skPA,skTS,skT) output by Setup, for all
voters i ∈ E with voter identifier vid, for all τ ←
GetToken(i) where m is the corresponding ballot num-
ber, and for any ballot β← Vote(τ,c) with c ∈ C , we
have that Extract(skT,skPA,β) = ((vid,m),c).
2. For any (BB,β)← A() we have that Valid(BB,β) = >
implies ValidInd(β) =>.
3. For all probabilistic polynomial time adversary A we
have that
Pr
[
Exps-consA ,V (`,E ,C ) = 1
]
is a negligible function in ` (see Figure 11 for the game).
The first condition ensures that Extract can extract
((vid,m),c) correctly for honestly created ballots. The second
condition ensures that ballots that are accepted by Valid with
respect to the board BB must also be accepted by ValidInd.
Finally, the third condition ensures that the adversary cannot
produce bulletin boards where the result r does not correspond
to the formal result function ρ executed on the individual bal-
Exps-consA ,V (`,E ,C ):
(pk,skPA,skTS,skT)← Setup(1`,E ,C )
BB = [β1, . . . ,βnB ]← A(pk,skPA)
If ∃βi s.t. ValidInd(βi) =⊥ then return 0
Let S ,Φ← Filter(BB,n′B,skTS)
Let (r,Π)← Tally(BB ‖ S ‖Φ,skT)
If r =⊥ return 0
If r 6= ρ(Extract(skT,skPA,β1), . . . ,Extract(skT,skPA,βnB))
return 1, else return 0.
Figure 11: In the strong-consistency experiment Exps-consA ,V ,
adversary A must output a board BB with ballots that are not
tallied correctly given Extract.
Exps-corrA ,V (`):
(pk,skPA,skTS,skT)← Setup(1`)
(i,τ,c,BB)← A(pk,skPA)
Let β= Vote(τ,c)
If Vote aborts because τ is invalid, return >
Else return Valid(BB,β)
Figure 12: In the strong-correctness experiment Exps-corrA ,V , the
adversary outputs a board BB such that an honest ballot by a
voter of its choice is not valid.
lots. (The adversary loses if Filter or Tally aborts because of
an invalid bulletin board.)
A.2 Strong correctness
Finally, a malicious protocol designer might modify which
ballots are accepted based on earlier ballots. To address this
attack, Bernhard et al. [7] introduce the notion of strong cor-
rectness. Informally, a scheme has strong correctness if hon-
estly generated ballots are accepted regardless of the content
of the bulletin board.
Definition 8 (Adapted from Bernhard et
al. [7]). Consider a voting scheme V =
(Setup,GetToken,Vote,Filter,VerifyFilter,Tally,Verify)
for an electoral roll E and candidate list C . We say the
scheme has strong correctness if
Pr
[
Exps-corrA ,V (`) =⊥
]
is a negligible function in ` (see Figure 12 for the game).
Theorem 4. VOTEAGAIN provides strong-consistency and
strong-correctness.
Proof of theorem 4. This proof roughly follows that of the
strong consistency and strong correctness of Helios in the
full version of Bernhard et al. [6]. To show that VOTEAGAIN
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is strongly consistent, we define the following Extract and
ValidInd algorithms:
• Extract(β,skTS,skT) operates on a ballot
β = (v,pi,pk,γ, I,στ,σ). First, it verifies the proof
pi, and the signatures στ and σ as in step 1 of Valid in
procedure 4. If any check fails, it returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it recovers the candidate c = Vote.Dec(skT,v) (note that
c ∈ C because pi is valid). Then it decrypts γ and I to
get (vid,m) = (EC.Dec(skPA,γ),EC.Dec(skPA, I)). It
returns ((vid,m),c).
• ValidInd(β) proceeds as in step 1 of Valid in procedure 4
to verify the ballot:
Vote.Verify(pkT,v,pi)
Sig.Verify(pk,σ,v ‖ pi ‖ pk ‖ γ ‖ I ‖ στ)
Sig.Verify(pkPA,στ,pk ‖ γ ‖ I).
It returns > if all are valid, and ⊥ otherwise.
First we show that the first condition of strong consistency
is satisfied. By the correctness of the zero-knowledge proofs
and decryption algorithms, Extract will indeed extract the
required values for valid ballots.
Since ValidInd executes a strict subset of the checks in Valid,
it follows that the second condition is trivially satisfied.
For the third condition, we need to show that the adversary
cannot create a valid bulletin board BB (i.e., one on which
Filter and Tally do not fail), but where the result is incorrect
(respect to the output calculated with the extractor function).
Note that by the checks in steps 1 and 4 of procedure 5, we
know that the identifier pairs (vid ,m) are unique. Consider
the group G j of ballots corresponding to vid j. The ideal result
function ρ includes the vote where the ballot index is highest.
In exactly the same way, Filter sets V j to v j∗ where the index
j∗ maximizes the ballot index m j∗. The equivalence of the
ideal result and the result produced by tally now follows.
To show that VOTEAGAIN is strongly correct we need to
prove that an adversary cannot create a ballot box BB such that
an honest voter, when generating an honest ballot β, that ballot
will be rejected, i.e., Valid(BB,β) =⊥. Note that the verifica-
tion in Valid(β) is twofold. First, it verifies the validity of the
ballot. It is trivial to see that this check passes for an honestly
generated ballot. Second, it checks that the ephemeral public
key pk and encrypted vote v do not yet appear on the bulletin
board. Clearly, v does not appear because it was just gener-
ated honestly by the user. Moreover, neither does the public
key pk appear before, because it was just freshly generated
by the PA. Given that these two values contain a source of
randomness when generated, it proceeds that A can only win
with negligible probability.
B Proof of Coercion Resistance
Proof of theorem 2. We first specify how to construct
SimTally and SimFilter. As in the ballot privacy proof,
SimTally(BB,r) simply simulates the proof of shuffle and the
proof of correct decryption in Tally, so that regardless of the
values in S , r is the correct outcome.
The algorithm SimFilter(BB,n′B,r) proceeds similarly. It
takes as input the bulletin board BB, which it uses to deter-
mine the number of ballots nB, the number of registrations n′B,
and the result r. Moreover, it derives the number of real voters
n using r. It uses these data to compute the cover, and it adds
the correct number of dummy ballots (for these, it sets γ and
I to random ciphertexts) to obtain B′. Then it computes a list
of zero ciphertexts (encryptions of zero) of equal length, and
simulates the shuffle proof piσ. It then generates fake voter
identifiers vid and m corresponding to the cover it computed
earlier, associates these to shuffled ballot βi, and simulates
the proofs pideci . Next, for each resulting group, it generates
a random encryption of zero V j = Vote.ZEnc(pkT,r j) and
simulates the corresponding proof piselj . Then, it returns the
randomness r j and the indices of the dummy voters corre-
sponding to the cover it computed early. Finally, for each
remaining vote, it generates a random Vj and simulates the
shuffle proof pi′σ.
In this proof, we will step by step replace all the ciphertexts
that depend on the bit b by random ciphertexts. In particular,
we first show that the adversary learns nothing about b during
the election phase. We then show that it also learns nothing
about b during the tally phase. The result follows.
Game G1. Game G1 is as the Exp
cr,b
A ,V (`,E ,C ) experiment.
(Note that contrary to the proof of ballot privacy we do not
fix the value for b.)
Game G2. Game G2 is as game G1, but we compute the result
directly based on the ballots on BB0. Let [β1, . . . ,βnB ] be
the list of ballots where
βi = (vi,pii,pki,γi, Ii,στi ,σi).
Let ci = Vote.Dec(sk,vi), vidi = EC.Dec(skTS,γi), and
mi = EC.Dec(skTS, Ii). Then compute the result:
r = ρ(((vid1,m1),c1), . . . ,((vidnB ,mnB),cnB))
As per strong consistency, games G2 and G1 are indistin-
guishable.
Game G3. Game G3 is as game G2, but with all the zero-
knowledge proofs replaced by simulations. This includes
the shuffle proof piσ, the decryption proofs of pideci of the
shuffled γ′i and I′i s, the reencryption proofs piseli , and the
shuffle proof pi′σ produced in Filter; as well as the tally proof
Π0 which we replace by the output of SimTally(BB0,r). We
use the random oracle to simulate this step, which is indis-
tinguishable by the simulatability of the zero-knowledge
proof system.
Game G4. Game G4 is as game G3 but we do not decrypt the
γi and Ii anymore when running Filter. Instead, we proceed
as follows. All ballots βi = (vi,pii,pki,γi, Ii,στi ,σi) on the
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bulletin boards are valid. Hence, σi is a valid signature
by PA0 resp. PA1 on γi and Ii. Since the signature scheme
is unforgeable, we know these ciphertexts were created
by PA0 resp. PA1. Hence, we can associate to them the
corresponding plaintexts vidi and mi. Moreover, we know
the permutation used by the TS during Filter, so we can
also provide the correct plaintexts in step 4 of Filter on BB0
(recall the proofs of decryption pideci are already simulated).
Game G5. Game G5 is as game G4, but we replace the cipher-
texts γi and Ii in the token τi by random ciphertexts for
all tokens. Similarly, we replace the γi and Ii ciphertexts
for the dummy ballots by random ciphertexts. Note that
per the change in game G4 we still associate the correct
plaintexts vidi and mi in the Filter protocol. A hybrid argu-
ment with reductions to the CPA security of the ElGamal
encryption scheme shows that games G5 and G4 are indis-
tinguishable. This reduction is possible since we no longer
need to decrypt these ciphertexts.
Game G6. Game G6 is as game G5, but we replace the en-
crypted votes vi in the OvoteLR() call by encryptions of
the zero vector, i.e., vi = Vote.ZEnc(pkT,r) for a uniformly
random randomizer r. As in the ballot privacy proof, a hy-
brid argument with a reduction to the NM-CPA security
of the ElGamal encryption scheme with zero-knowledge
proof shows that games G6 and G5 are indistinguishable.
Note that in this reduction we use the Odec of the NM-CPA
challenger to decrypt votes in the adversary-determined bal-
lots before computing the result r.
Note that as of game G6, the adversary’s view of the bulletin
board before calling Otally() is independent of the value of b.
(The ballots resulting from the OvoteLR call also contain a
random ephemeral public key pk and the signatures στ and σ,
but these are also independent of the actual voter selected.)
We now proceed to show that the adversary also cannot
learn anything from the output of Filter. Notice that, regardless
of the value of b, the filter step is computed with the same
number of voters ν, the same number of ballots nB and the
same number of obtained tokens n′B. Therefore, the output
of Filter applied to BB0 and that of SimFilter applied to BB1
should be indistinguishable. In the following game steps we
replace the ciphertexts after shuffling by zero-ciphertexts and
show that these steps are indistinguishable for the adversary.
Game G7. Game G7 is the same as game G6, but we replace
the ciphertexts γ′i, I′i and θ′i after shuffling by random en-
cryptions of zero. We proceed as if they still decrypt to the
correct values. Note that we already simulate the shuffle
proof and decryption proofs. Again, a hybrid argument with
reductions to the CPA security of the ElGamal encryption
scheme shows that the games G7 and G6 are indistinguish-
able. This reduction is possible since we no longer need to
decrypt these ciphertexts.
Game G8. Game G8 is the same as game G7, but we replace
the shuffled encrypted votes v′i by random encryptions of
zero. Similarly, we replace the randomizations, R, of the
votes corresponding to dummy voters by the corresponding
new randomization. This causes the pre-selected votes V j
per group to be incorrect, but this does not matter as we
simulate the second shuffle proof, pi′σ, anyway. As before,
the indistinguishability of this step follows from the NM-
CPA security of the vote encryption scheme.
Game G9. Game G9 is the same as game G8, but we replace
the second shuffled votes Vj by random encryption of zero.
This causes the selected votes Vj after the shuffle to be
incorrect with respect to the result, but this does not matter
as we simulate the proof of the tally. As before, the indistin-
guishability of this step follows from the NM-CPA security
of the vote encryption scheme.
Game G10. Game G10 is as game G9, but we replace the filter
and tally proofs on BB0 by simulations: we set (S0,Φ0)←
SimFilter(BB0,n′B,r) andΠ0← SimTally(BB0,r). Note that
this difference is purely syntactic, as per the changes we
made before, we already computed exactly the output of
SimFilter on BB0 and the result r.
Clearly the resulting view is independent of b. And coer-
cion resistance follows.
C Proof of Verifiability
Proof of theorem 3. At the end of the filter procedure, the TS
(or in our case, the adversary) outputs a list of selected votes
S = V1, . . . ,Vn, a proof Φ, the result r and the tally proof Π.
Because Π verifies, we know that the result r is the addition
of the votes contained in V1, . . . ,Vn.
We first show that each encrypted vote Vj contains a vote
for a single candidate or an empty vote. Given that piσ and pi′σ
validate, we know that the vote Vj corresponds to a group of
ballot indices G j = i1, . . . , iχ j , corresponding to voter identi-
fier vid j. Moreover, the index j∗ is such that the decrypted
index m j∗ is maximal. Because piselj is valid, we know that
either
1. Vj is the reencryption of vote v j∗ and EC.Dec(θ j∗) = g0,
2. Vj is the encryption of zero and EC.Dec(∏
χ j
k=1 θik) = g
χ j .
We now show that in the first case v j∗ must be the encryption
of a single candidate. Because θ j∗ = g0 and the correctness
of the shuffle proofs piσ,pi′σ, we know that v j∗ originates from
a valid ballot cast by a voter. This ballot included a proof that
v j∗ is the encryption of a single candidate.
Let ν be the number of voters that requested a voting token
and for which at least one ballot is included on the bulletin
board. We argue that the number of non-zero ballots that
is included in the tally equals ν. Let vidi1 , . . . ,vidiν be the
corresponding voter identifiers. Because of the correctness of
the shuffle, piσ, there exists corresponding groups Gi1 , . . . ,Giν
to these voter identifiers after shuffling.
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We show that any other group Gξ contributes an empty vote
to the tally. Let vidξ be the corresponding voter identity. The
adversary cannot forge signatures by the PA, so any ballot
with voter identity vidξ was added as a dummy ballot with θD
as a tag. Therefore, in group Gξ, each tag encrypts g1, so the
only possible disjunct in piselξ is therefore the second, and thus
V ξ is the encryption of zero.
We show that only such encrypted votes may be removed
after the second shuffle. The adversary needs to find a ran-
dom r such that Vi = Vote.ZEnc(pkT,r). Given that the DL-
assumption holds, the adversary can only find such r if the
underlying plaintext is zero with very high probability. Given
that the encryption of candidate zero is not a permitted op-
tion for real voters, and given the correctness of pi, only votes
corresponding to the above groups may be removed by the
adversary after the second shuffle.
So, we now know that only the groups Gi1 , . . . ,Giν each
contribute exactly one candidate to the tally, and no more
candidates are added by the other groups. We assign each
group to one of the three groups in the game: the voters in
Checked, the voters in Unchecked, or the voters in Corrupted.
The result then follows.
We now show that the correct values are tallied for each
of the voters in Checked that verified that their ballots were
correctly cast. Consider a voter i ∈ Checked with voter iden-
tifier vidi. Let ctr be the last ballot that it verified. We need
to show that the tally includes either i’s ballot ctr, or a later
ballot. We know ballot ctr was added to the bulletin board.
Therefore, the corresponding group Gi (matching voter identi-
fier vidi) containing χi ballots, must contain a shuffled ballot
(v′j,vidi,m j,θ′j) corresponding to the original ballot ctr (be-
cause the shuffle proof and decryption proofs are valid). Note
that θ′j must be a decryption of g0 by construction, therefore
the tags in group G j (which must be encryptions of g0 or g1)
can never sum to gχi and therefore, we must take the first
disjunct in the reencryption proof piseli : V i must be the reen-
cryption of an encrypted ballot j∗ where θ j∗ decrypts to g0.
Therefore, piseli must contain the encrypted vote corresponding
to a real ballot cast by voter i. Finally, since j∗maximizes m j∗
in the group, we know in particular, that m j∗ ≥m j correspond-
ing to the verified ballot. Therefore, we conclude that indeed
V i reencrypts either ballot ctr by voter i, or a later ballot by
voter i. Given the correctness of the second shuffled proved
with pi′σ, there will be a selected ballot Vi encrypting the same
value as V i. Finally, given the correctness of the mixnet and
decryption proofs in Tally, either ctr by voter i, or a later ballot
by voter i, will be counted in the final tally.
Now suppose a group Gi corresponds to a voter i in
Unchecked. Then, by the same argument as for voters in
Checked, we know that the tally must either drop all ballots
or include one of the ballots cast by voter i.
Finally, any remaining groups correspond to voters in
Corrupted. Notice that any voter that is not in Checked or
Unchecked must be in Corrupted. Since, each remaining
group corresponds to an actual voter, and this voter is not
in either of the former groups, it must indeed correspond to a
voter in Corrupted.
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